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BOOK REVIEW
Extraterritorial Antitrust: The Sherman Act and U.S. Business
Abroad. By James B. Townsend. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980.
Pp. 308, $27.50.
Reviewed by PaulH. Brietzke*
Owing to recent changes in the political climate of antitrust,
Professor Townsend's book has a timeliness that might not have been
apparent when it went to press. Citing antitrust bills authored
by Senators Hart and Bayh, he warns that a "rising populism since
1976 would tend to argue for continuing caution"' among businessmen who expect favorable changes in the law. "Populism" may
still be rising, but antitrust "hawks" have no part in it: Hart is
dead and Bayh defeated, key Congressional committee chairs and
bureaucratic posts have seemingly gone to antitrust "doves," and
Townsend's arguments can thus be expected to find a much more
receptive audience. Many in Washington and elsewhere are deeply
concerned about the marked and relatively recent deterioration2
in the economic performance of American companies overseas.
Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University; Ph.D. in Law,
*
University of London, 1979.
J. Townsend, Extraterritorial Antitrust: The Sherman Antitrust
1.
Act and U.S. Business Abroad 225 (1980) [hereinafter cited as J. Townsend].
"Populism" is a term much misused in antitrust analyses, as a mildly derogatory label for those who favor an aggressive enforcement policy. This seems
to be the sense in which Townsend uses it, but the reader cannot be certain.
Over the last decade, America's share of world trade declined 23%,
2.
resulting in the loss of two million domestic jobs. Address by Robert Reich,
AALS Antitrust Section (San Antonio, Jan. 5, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
The better view is that the loss of jobs through competition from
Reich].
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Supply-side economists, 3 who apparently have the ear of the Reagan
Administration, attribute this failing to, among other things, an
overzealous, extraterritorial application of United States antitrust
laws. 4 This position fits nicely with Townsend's and with those
taken by the Chicago School of antitrust (protrust?). To simplify,
but not by much, the Chicago School favors an extensive relaxation
of antitrust enforcement in most areas. 5 Their arguments are
clinched in the area of foreign trade by linking them to national
security issues. Companies in technologically-advanced industries
(microchips, aircraft, etc.), they say, must be strengthened for
defense purposes by giving them a free hand to augment their export
potential: 6 future American missiles cannot be safely guided by
Japanese microcomputers. The logic of, and empirical support
for these arguments are far from impeccable, but the same can
be said of the justifications for any other antitrust policy. Townsend's book provides some of the grist needed by the antitrust
policy mill, which is starting up once again.
Until very recently, 7 the judicial battle lines over extraterritorial antitrust were drawn fairly clearly. The dominant view-few
victories are ever permanent in antitrust-is perhaps best represented by Judge Rifkind:
The major premise of the Sherman Act is that
imports is small compared to losses through technological change. Belassa,
The 'New Protectionism' and the International Economy, 12 J. World Tr. L.
409, 427 (1978); Friedman, Do Imports Cost Jobs?, Newsweek, Feb. 9, 1981,
at 77.
3.
While this generic label encompasses some diversity of opinion,
it serves to describe those economists who see increased levels of savings and
investment (inevitably at the expense of consumption) and radical reductions
in the governmental regulation of business as the keys to increased productivity.
The growing dominance of these economists reflects a radically rightward
shift in economists' thinking over the last decade, a dissolution of the Keynesian
consensus. Dean, The Dissolution of the Keynesian Consensus, Pub. Interest,
(Special Issue), 1980, 19, at 29-30 passim. See Galbraith, The Conservative
Onslaught, New York Rev. of Books,Jan. 22, 1981, at 30.
4.
Address by Ira Millstein, AALS Antitrust Section (San Antonio,
Jan. 5, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Millstein] ; see also Reich, supra note 2.
See, e.g, R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 405.07 passim (1978)
5.
[hereinafter cited as Bork]. See also Brietzke, Book Review, 13 Val. U.L. Rev.
403 (1979).
6.
Reich, supra note 2.
7.
See notes 63-68 and accompanying text infira.
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the suppression of competition in international
trade is in and of itself a public injury; or at
any rate, that such a suppression is a greater
price than we want8 to pay for the benefits
it sometimes secures.
The courts do not . . . readily permit

9
a frustration of valid national policy.
The more flexible approach reflected in Justice Frankfurter's Timken
dissent 1 0 made little headway:
Of course, it is not for this Court to formulate
economic policy as to foreign commerce. But
the conditions controlling foreign commerce
may be relevant here. When as a matter of
cold fact the legal, financial and governmental
policies deny opportunities for exportation ...

and importation . . ., arrangements that afford

such opportunities to American enterprise
may not fall under the ban of a fair construction of the Sherman Law because comparable
commerce
arrangements regarding domestic
11
came within its condemnation.
8.
United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 525 (S.D.N.Y.
1945), aff'd 332 U.S. 319 (1947) (quoted by J. Townsend at 67).
9.
Id. at 525 n.8 (quoted byJ. Townsend at 65).
10. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593, 605-06
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoted by J. Townsend at 74). See text
accompanying notes 61, 64 & 65 infra. Cf. 341 US. at 607-08 (Jackson,J.,
dissenting). Like many another of Justice Frankfurther's "of course" statements
about judicial self-restraint, this one finds little support in the case law. The
Court will inevitably "formulate economic policy" because this is the role
assigned to it by the broad and vague Sherman Act. See Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949):
I regard it as unfortunate that the Clayton Act [and,
presumably, the Sherman Act] submits such economic
It not only leaves
issues to judicial determination.
the law vague as a warning or guide, and determined
only after the event, but the judicial process is not well
adapted to exploration of such industry-wide, and
even nation-wide, questions.
Id. at 322 (Jackson,J. dissenting).
11.
341 US. at 605-06 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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We can assume that this degree of play in the antitrust joints would
be a congenial state of affairs for the Reagan Administration. It
certainly finds eager support in Townsend's book, which treats
five related topics: the historical development of key concepts
in the Sherman Act, its extraterritorial application traced through
the cases, advice to managers of United States multinational corporations (MNCs) about the practical impact of these cases, an
opinion survey of managers of large MNCs which assesses the impact of extraterritorial antitrust on business decisions, and an estimate of the extent to which extraterritorial antitrust coincides
with the interests of the American public.
Townsend's historical perspective on the Sherman Act is very
well done within the brief compass chosen. 1 2 Brevity was a logical
choice, since the history is tangential to his main topics. He avoids
the trap, into which others have fallen, 13 of ascribing a single,
one-dimensional intention to Congress in 1890: "Sometimes fools
rush in where angels fear to tread, but history is often made in
just that way. More likely, the framers of the [Sherman] Act saw
the Gordian knot of conflicting interests as incapable of precise
solution." 1 4 Townsend's discussion of the per se rule 1 5 is particularly good. Overall, he finds antitrust decisions "nebulous" and
"as frustrating as they are puzzling."' 1 6 This must seem a truism
to all but a few of the antitrust cognoscenti, but some of the evidence on which he bases this conclusion is shaky. His history chapter takes its prolegomenon from Justice Holmes's first antitrust
dissent, which begins with: "Great cases like hard cases make
bad law." 17 This passage has, of course, stimulated much discussion,
12. See J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 2540. The survey does, however,
omit the 1920s, when the Court developed the basic antitrust rules applicable
to trade associations and systematically gutted the Federal Trade Commission
-a treatment from which that agency has never fully recovered.
13. See, eg., Baxter, Placing the Burger Court in Historical Perspective,
47 Antitrust LJ. 803, 803 (1979); R. Bork, supra note 5, at 61.

14.

J.Townsend, supra note 1, at 30.

15. See id. at 38-40. The per se rule may be defined as follows:
"[T] here are certain agreemcnts or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively pre-

sumed to be unreason*able and therefore illegal [per sel, without elaborate
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use." United States v. N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (per Black, J.).
16. J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 1.
17. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 US. 197,400 (1904)
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but not among contemporary antitrust lawyers. Until the Burger
Court, virtually all antitrust cases reaching the Court were arguably
"great." Can we deduce from Holmes's aphorism that they were
18
also all "bad"? This is the tack Townsend would have us take,
but Holmes is arguably an unreliable witness against antitrust.
He wrote no significant antitrust opinion for a majority of the
Court (apart from the questionable Window Glass1 9 and the superseded American Banana20 ), and the "nature of his contribution
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (quoted by J. Townsend at 25). Holmes argued that
when a holding company is created from the Northern Pacific and Great
Northern railroads, evoking high political passion and economic resentment, the
Sherman Act is to be read "as if the question were whether two small exporting
grocers shall go to jail." 193 U.S. at 402 (HolmesJ. dissenting).
18.
"[P] erhaps, as Justice Holmes may have summarized his dissent...,
one might more charitably observe that bad cases often make bad law." J.
Townsend, supra note 1, at 88. If that is what Holmes meant, he would certainly have said so: "Like our own Austin,... Holmes was sometimes clearly
wrong; but again like Austin, when this was so he was always wrong clearly."
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593,
593 (1958).
19. Natl Ass'n of Window Glass Mfr's v. United States, 263 U.S. 403
(1923). Justice Holmes, for the Court, found that the agreement in issue did
not concern sales or distribution, and thus its legality must depend on the
facts. The relevant facts were that the growing economic efficiency of machinery used in the production of glass, coupled with the decrease in available manpower, were posing a serious threat to manufacturers of hand-blown glass.
As a result, an agreement was entered into between such manufacturers and
the union representative of the labor force whereby half the factories would
run exclusively for half the season, and the remaining factories would run
during the other half. This would secure employment for all of the labor force
for the whole of the season, while saving manufacturers unnecessary expenses
from operating undermanned. In view of this, the agreement was seen not
to be an unreasonable restraint of trade.
20. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co, 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
In July, 1904, the government of Costa Rica, by virtue of its sovereign power,
seized plaintiff's banana plantation lying within its jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleged
that this action was instigated by the defendant in order to further its monopolistic control over the market and thereby violated United States law. The
Court, however, took the view that since the acts took place outside the United
States, they were not governed by any acts of Congress. "A conspiracy in this
country to do acts in another jurisdiction does not draw to itself those acts
and make them unlawful, if they are permitted by local law." Id. at 359.
For a full discussion of the line of cases superseding American Banana,
see J. Townsend at 42-88.
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. . . dims the lustre of his otherwise incomparable

renown.
Another Justice, Tom Clark, is prominently quoted by Townsend to the effect that businessmen "naturally detest" the "vagueness and uncertainty" of antitrust laws. 2 2 This is obviously true,
but it is only part of the story: businessmen "detest" the certainty
of antitrust liability under rigid per se rules even more; the certainty
they would much prefer is the certainty of non-liability, and "vagueness and uncertainty" comes in second-best. Further, Clark felt
able to offer a very different characterization of the antitrust laws
in a different context, 2 3 thereby illustrating the chameleonic nature
of judicial attitudes toward antitrust. As Townsend briefly notes,
Europeans who contemplate doing business in the United States
find these judicial attitudes "excessively legalistic and not sufficiently pragmatic." 2 4 As this is a criticism commonly made of
European legal systems by those familiar with the common law,
21. M. Handler, Antitrust in Perspective 13 (1957). Welcoming economic concentration, Holmes clashed fiercely on economic issues with his
Another famous Holmes
Id.
constitutional comrade-in-arms, Brandeis.
aphorism seems broadly representative of the attitudes of the Justices and
the "intellectual maquis" (e.g., Herbert Croly, Thorsten Veblen and Charles
Beard) of the twenties: "I don't disguise my belief that the Sherman Act is
a humbug based on economic ignorance and incompetence." Letter from
Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollack (April 23, 1910) reprinted in
1 Holmes-Pollack Letters 163 (M. Howe ed. 1941). See G. Lodge, The New
American Ideology 154 (1978). This line of thought was, however, cut off

by the Depression and the bureaucratic revival of antitrust late in the New
Deal. It is conceivable but fairly unlikely that it will be revived in the future.
22. Clark, Foreword to E. Kinter, Antitrust Primer at ix (2d ed. 1973)
(quoted by J. Townsend at 16). See also Standard Oil of California v. United
States, 337 US. 293, 322 (1949) (Jackson,J. dissenting).
23. Clark stated that, for the Court, antitrust is not
a riddle in which the participants try to guess the answer
syllable by syllable. We at least know what the problem
is and its consequence. The problem is simple. Are
the parties keeping within the law? The evidence is
no guesswork either. Perhaps the economists try to reduce it to an enigma, but the Court is able to see
through their gyrations and come out about right.
Clar*:, A Judicial View, in Antitrust and the Judicial Process 17, 18 (1968)
(Conference Board, 7th Conf. on Antitrust Issues). Clark was Head of the
Antitrust Division and Attorney -General prior to his elevation to the Bench.
24. J. Townsend, supra note 1,at 126.
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antitrust must be a strange bird to prompt Europeans to return
the compliment. This is indeed the case; antitrust is ius sui gen'ris
from the civil law perspective, combining as it does elements of
national and international private, administrative 2 5and criminal
laws with unique historical and philosophical adjuncts.
The historical, philosophical and domestic elements of antitrust are dealt with adroitly by Townsend, who makes only the
briefest of mentions of antitrust problems arising under international
law. These fall outside his chosen frame of reference, which is the
real and perceived effects of the Sherman Act on United States
While this truncation of the subject is unobjectionable
MNCs.
at one level-a topic must be delimited somehow to remain manageable, and other works 2 6 deal fairly effectively with the problems that non-Americans face under the United States antitrust
laws-it makes the interests of United States MNCs appear more
congruent with the public interest than they really are, as I shall
argue below.
In 1955, it seemed "clear" that the Sherman Act applied
"to acts abroad, performed by an American firm acting alone or
in concert with foreign firms with such substantial effect upon
American foreign commerce as to amount to unreasonable restraints,
attempts to monopolize, or monopolization." 2 7 The same is only
a little less clear today despite as Townsend notes, the cases being
Most of the relevant cases are
few and "relatively obscure."
also studied with regard to their implications for domestic antitrust, and lawyers familiar with the cases will find many old friends
appearing in new and interesting configurations in Townsend's
He ascribes the earlier, strictly territorial jurisdiction in
book.
antitrust to "legal isolationism" and the later and broader "protective principle" to the Court's "insularity." 2 9 This sounds like
25. See H. Zwarensteyn, Some Aspects of the Extraterritorial Reach
of the American Antitrust Laws 68, 76-77 (1970) [hereinafter cited as H.
Zwarensteyn].
26. See, e.g., H. Zwarensteyn, note 25 supra, for a full discussion of
this topic.
27.

See Report of the Attorney General's Committee to Study the

Antitrust Laws 70 (1955).
28.

A. Simons, The Sherman Antitrust Act and Foreign Trade 5 (1962)

(quoted by J. Townsend at 1). But see notes 63-68 and accompanying text
infra. Little attention is paid to extraterritoriality in general works on antitrust: for example, a standard 900-page text devotes only three pages to it.
L. Sullivan, Antitrust § 234, 714-17 (1977).
29. J. Townsend,supra note 1, at 41,47, 75.
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a paradox, yet, as with some paradoxes, it is probably true in the
sense that both jurisdictional rules reflect a preoccupation with
effects on American competition to the virtual exclusion of all
other considerations. For Townsend, the extraterritoriality of the
antitrust laws was expanded in response to the "emergence of the
United States as a world power in 1945": America "stood above
all others in power and wealth. What it could do, and would do
without challenge, might surpass even the forbidden dreams of
others." 3 0 Extraterritorial jurisdiction connotes power, the power
to render binding decisions, and America's antitrust rules seem out
of step with changes in her relative wealth and status. Townsend
does not pursue this line of thought,3 1 however, confining himself
to the inconveniences experienced by United States MNCs.
From this perspective Townsend's discussion is, with a couple
of slips, 3 2 excellent, although a few cases perhaps deserve more
prominence than they receive 3 3 and a few important cases are
30. Id. at 47.
31. Townsend merely states parenthetically that "(The United States
assuredly would not allow others to legislate the quantity of its exports and
imports)." J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 85. This is not as obvious as the
parentheses suggest: What the United States will "allow" has or may become
increasingly irrelevant, and some would argue that Japan is already legislating
a high volume of imports for the United States. See note 32 infra.
32. See J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 248. Townsend further states
that:
[P] ermissible joint arrangements [under the Defense
Production Act, § 708 and the Sherman Act] were too
limited to enable the [United States oil] companies
to counter effectively Libya's nationalization tactics
in 1969 and the demands of ... OPEC ... the following year. . . . The desire to protect consumer choice
rather than business opportunity had set in motion
a cascading chain of events that occurred in time to
cause a massive transfer of the world's wealth to the
OPEC nations.
Id. at 137.
With respect, the "chain" of causation was much more complex than
this: Gaddafy's actions and the growing dependence of the West on oil imports
could hardly have been countered by any conceivable antitrust policy. The
foo-note to this passage cites Senate subcommittee hearings but states that:
"The conclusion is the author's, not the subcommittee's." Id. at 202 n. 108.
33. E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 443 U.S. 36 (1977);
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); Continental
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excluded,3 4 presumably because they fall outside his frame of
reference. An author is entitled to choose which cases to analyze
and how, but Townsend's omission of the most sweeping of jurisdictional statements under the Sherman Act, from Pacific Seafarers,3 5 is puzzling:
If, as the defendants contend, that policy
["limiting the accumulation and exercise of
dominant economic power"] cannot extend
to the full sweep of American foreign commerce
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 US. 690 (1962) (conspiracy
to monopolize or restrain United States domestic or foreign trade confers
jurisdiction even though conduct occurred overseas). Penn-Olin is the leading
case on joint ventures, devices much in vogue among MNCs, yet it receives
only a brief mention: see J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 154.
34. E.g., Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944); United States
v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), affd per curiam
385 U.S. 37 (1966). In Branch it was held that the FTC has jurisdiction over
the false and deceptive advertising of correspondence courses in Latin America
by United States companies: much of the objectionable activity occurred in
the United States and American competitors have the right to be protected
from "defilement." This is not an antitrust case, but it is commonly cited as
an example of the applicable standard of antitrust extraterritoriality: see,
e.g., H. Zwarensteyn, supra note 25, at 139-40. Branch became more important
when the FTC's antitrust jurisdiction was expanded from "in commerce"
to "in or affecting commerce." Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, § 5,
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976). This amendment enables the FTC to take a greater
interest in extraterritorial antitrust in the future. This is not mentioned by
Townsend, presumably because he restricts his analyses to Sherman Act cases.
The FTC does, however, deal with many matters closely analogous to Sherman
Act violations. In Schlitz, the acquisition of a large Canadian brewery was
enjoined despite persuasive arguments that the sole reason for the acquisition
was participation in the Canadian market. Like Penn-Olin, supra note 33,
Schlitz arises under § 7 of the Clayton Act, which is outside the author's frame
of reference: see J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 145. At this point, his delimitation of the topic becomes too arbitrary; mergers cannot be sensibly
analyzed as Sherman Act violations with only the briefest mentions of the
Clayton Act. Id. at 145-50.
35. Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pac. Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1093 (1969) (Sherman Act applies
to conspiracy legal under lex situs and not involving American imports or
exports, where one American flag shipper forces another, the plaintiff, out
of carriage of goods between Asian ports). The decision can be given a slightly
narrower reading, see 404 F.2d at 816, 819, but most commentators apply
it broadly: see, e.g., H. Zwarensteyn, supra note 25, at 80, 126.
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because of the international complications
involved, then surely the test which determines
whether United States law is applicable must
focus on the nexus between the parties and their
practices and the United States, not on the
effect on commechanical circumstances of
36
modity exports and imports.
This is the kind of thinking Townsend seeks to rebut throughout the book, although he takes pains to advise the managers of
United States MNCs of its effects on their operations. 3 7 This is
undoubtedly the most useful aspect of the book, a "what you can
and can't do under the Sherman Act" with the "can'ts" far outnumbering the "cans." The picture Townsend paints for MNC
managers is too bleak, 3 8 but perhaps not by much. He finds that
36. 404 F.2d at 818.
37. See J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 123-219.
38. Townsend is arguably too brief and too negative concerning antitrust exemptions under the Defense Production Act of 1950, § 708, ch. 932,
64 Stat. 798 (1950) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 2158 (1976)), and the
Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976). See J. Townsend, supra note 1,
at 135-37. These statutes do, of course, fall outside his frame of reference.
He may also take too dim a view of antitrust exemptions arising from actions
by a foreign sovereign: see J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 82-83, 14243. It
is quite likely that the immunity of foreign sovereigns will be expanded on
the basis of a comity and judicial self-restraint akin to the Burger Court's "new
federalism" in New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S
96 (1978); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). Insufficiently stressed is the MNC's ability to protect itself against imports from
its subsidiaries, licensees or competitors under the Sherman Act, the RobinsonPatman Act, § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) (price discrimination), the AntiDumping Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976) (selling in the United States at
lower than home prices or goods' reasonable value), The Tariff Act of 1930,
§ 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976) (as amended) (unfair competition). See, e.g.,
J. Townsend, supra note 1, 159-61, 179-82. Worries that a foreign subsidiary,
a device popular with United States business and broadly lawful under antitrust laws, will be decreed unlawful because the overseas market is too small
to support more than one company-J. Townsend, supra, note 1, at 14243are all but groundless: this has long been recognized as an antitrust defense.
Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st
Cir. 1960); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30
(2d Cir. 1945). Townsend fails to advise MNC managers of the incredible
proof problems involved in bringing an antitrust case with international dimensions. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F.
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"widely disparate" national regimes of antitrust send international
"competitors into different races with different rules" and starting
3 9 Whether and
points, to the disadvantage of United States MNCs.
to what extent this is in fact true has long been the subject of intense
debate, much of which is given its fair say in Townsend's book.
What he neglects to mention is that (to extend his metaphor) the
notion of different races, rules and starting points can become
an all-to-convenient excuse for the losing American runner who
stumbles or lacks the stamina to compete for reasons unrelated
to antitrust.
In the book, managers of MNCs get to talk back to the antitrust laws. It is always helpful to know what businessmen think
about law, and Townsend undoubtedly did the best he could under
the circumstances to elicit opinions. There are, however, serious
methodological faults to be found with Townsend's opinion survey,
some of which he acknowledges, 4 0 which render problematic any
policy conclusions he or we would wish to draw. For example,
all of Townsend's interviewees came from seventeen "Fortune
500" MNCs each of which had more than $1 billion in sales in
1974. Not surprisingly, they take a view of their business prospects
under an extraterritorial regime of antitrust which is reminiscent
of Mathew Arnold's view from Dover Beach.4 1 The largest of
Supp. 889 (ED. Pa. 1979). These, combined with the paucity of Antitrust
Division enforcement resources (mentioned briefly-J-. Townsend, supra note
1, at 224) and government's relative lack of interest in extraterritorial antitrust
enforcement mean that a United States MNC would have to be exceedingly
unlucky to be sued by the government. On the other hand, Townsend does
not sufficiently stress a significant and growing threat faced by United States
MNCs: treble damage suits, trade wars by other means, brought by foreign
and American competitors. See Millstein, supra note 4.
39. J. Townsend, supra note 1,at 127, 124-30.
40. Statistical measures of reliability are impossible because obtaining
answers to "a question general in aspect and broad in possibility" necessitates
"a descriptive survey," "a nonquantitative pilot study." J. Townsend, supra
note 1 at 5-7. Verbal data arguably introduces two levels of imprecisionspeaking and interpreting-and includes the risk of "leading" questions. Further,
bias is possible in so small a sample as 17 MNCs. Id. at 5. Townsend nevertheless concludes that: "The effect of the law on the MNC was ascertained by
interview." Id. at 123.
41. .. . for the world which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams;
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
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American companies find they have nothing to gain and everything
to lose when (as Harold Fleming puts it) "tropismatically suspicious"
government lawyers apply their "doctrine of original sin": "Build
a better mousetrap, sell enough of them, and [the] Justice Department ... will beat a path to your door.' 4 2 Going beyond Townsend's frame of reference, a better "balance" of business opinion
would have included the views of smaller exporters, importers and
MNCs, which are particularly important in technologically-advanced
industries. These firms obtain a limited protection, only some of
which is anticompetitive, from American and foreign rivals under
the antitrust laws. Further, even large MNCs are discovering the
balance-sheet magic of a treble damage antitrust suit (which is often
the most profitable investment conceivable). No mention is made
of this by Townsend or his interviewees.
Managers of seventeen MNCs were questioned about five types
export, joint venture, licensing (largely
of business strategies:
of technology), merger, and forming a subsidiary. Eight MNCs
reported that the antitrust laws had no effect on their business
decisions, while the other nine reported a total of sixteen effects
(plus three "indirect" effects). 4 3 Townsend finds in this a serious
condemnation of antitrust, but it can also be regarded as sixteen
out of eight-five (seventeen MNCs multiplied by five types of strategy) or a fairly low average of interference from antitrust. More
to the point, Townsend reports that in only three instances was
a decision not to enter an overseas market squarely based on antitrust considerations. 4 4 Two of these instances were reported by
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.

Arnold, Dover Beach, Penguin Book of English Verse 344, 345 (J.Haywood,
ed. 1956).
42. H. Fleming, Ten Thousand Commandments 10, 13, 56 (1951)
(anthology of Christian Science Monitor articles about antitrust intended "not
for lawyers but for people," id. at vii). Cf. L. Mason, The Language of Dissent
116 (1959) (competition "is something most businessmen like to see in every
other business but their own"); G. Steiner, Business and Society 414 (1971)
(businessmen "think of competition in terms of what their competitors are
doing to take business away from them and what they must do to keep and

increase their business").
43. J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 187 (Table 4.4).
44. Id. Townsend concludes that:
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"Company 1" (anonymity was respected), about which we learn
much in the course of the book. For example:
Company 1 has no aversion to licensing either
patents or know-how, but it has great reservations about its inability to protect itself by
contract against the reappearance of its own
technology in imported form. It complains
bitterly, pointing out that such protection
is accepted practice overseas.
Company 13 has no qualms about licensing. . . .

It is not concerned with protecting

its domestic markets, because the progress
of its technology is so rapid that any licensee
45
would be hard put to invade the US ....
Some lawyers would conclude that antitrust and patent laws are
working as they should here, rewarding innovation but not by
so much as to encourage complacency. (In any event, there are
good reasons why know-how receives no legal protection, in the
absence of a business tort.) 4 6 The daring Company 13 is also compared with Company 11:
Company 11 . . . will not enter any market
where prices are fixed. If already in a market,
it will leave when it is undersold. While there
has been no effect [from antitrust laws] on
Extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act generally
nullified the market-entry strategy of USMNCs engaged
The interaction of market and
in manufacturing.
antitrust either afforded no chance for an alternative
strategy of market entry or made it clear that a change
in strategy would bring the same results. In a very
few instances a company was able to achieve market
entry by changing to a market strategy less advantageous
to the company. The matter of market entry was made
more painful by the fact that markets lost by US.
firms could be gained by foreign competitiors not subject to corresponding antitrust restrictions.
J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 251.
45. Id. at 181.
46. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 US. 470 (1974);
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe
Oil and Refining Co., 322 US. 471 (1944).
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its overall market entry strategy, it could be
reasoned that its strategy has been negated.
Company 13 . . . will not participate in
any price-fixing scheme as a condition of market
entry. Unlike Company 11, if it is already
established in a market it will make every
effort to stay . . . by shaving profit margins,
explaining, "We sharpen up our pencils and
find a different way ...

."

Its entry strategy

has not been changed, but it, too, could be
considered to have been negated. 4 7
Arguably, Townsend's conclusions here are both non sequiturs.
Company 13's strategy seems to be to compete regardless of the
peccadillos by others that it would obviously prefer to do without.
The Sherman Act does not frustrate this strategy and would even
further it, given the right jurisdictional circumstances. The strategy
of Company 11 seems to be to prefer the "quiet life" to competition, a strategy the Act abhors. It does not follow that, but for
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, this excessively
timid behavior would change, however.
Townsend's survey makes no attempt to evaluate the intensity
of the Sherman Act's effect on business decisions. It seems plausible that an aggressive competitor will pursue very profitable opportunities abroad, letting the antitrust laws go hang and rationalizing
the very few resulting lawsuits to the board of directors as an inevitable consequence of the law's "vagueness and uncertainty."
(Businessmen would, of course, be exceedingly reluctant to volunteer this kind of opinion.) For such a competitor, only decisions
involving business opportunities of marginal profitability will truly
be affected by the antitrust laws (discounted by the probability of
getting caught). This does not mean that the antitrust laws cannot
also serve as a rationalization of managerial timidity to a board
of directors or to a diligent researcher such as Professor Townsend.
Private practitioners of antitrust, professional naysayers, foster this
strategy by and large, 4 8 stand behind a company when it "com-

47. j. Townsend,supra note 1, at 161.
48. At a conference on March 9, 1977, Douglas E. Rosenthal, the
Assistant Chief of the Justice Department's Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, stated:

One of my biggest surprises since joining the
government three years ago has been the number of
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plains bitterly" to all who will listen, and even serve as scapegoats
on occasion.
To be fair to Professor Townsend, much of the discussion of
his opinion survey is careful and useful. It is insufficient to support
the Sherman Act has
his central policy conclusion, however:
"brought us more than our rightful share of international economic
disadvantage.' 4 9 This may be true if "us" means very large United
States MNCs, but what if the American public is included in "us,"
as citizens and as consumers of imports and domestically-produced
goods? While properly warning us of "the Justice Department's
implicit attitude that it alone is capable of determining the public
interest," 50 Townsend goes too far in the opposite direction toward
times businessmen have told me that their antitrust
lawyers advised them they could not enter potentially
profitable and non-collusive ventures because of poFrequently they are told
tential antitrust liability.
by their lawyers that it is not even worthwhile looking
at the facts of a particular proposed venture. If that
is the counsel some businessmen are receiving, it is
little wonder that they view us as an impediment to
business growth.
Department of Justice Guide for International Operations, [1977] 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,309, at 55, 654 [hereinafter cited as Rosenthal].
49. J. Townsend, supra note 1, at xi.
50. Id. at 228. A subtle but nevertheless telling example of this
"implicit attitude" is offered by a former Assistant Attorney-General:
A company has a perfect right to refuse to give any
However, it should be kept in mind
information ....
that except by inquiry and investigation law enforcement officials have no means of distinguishing between
those who are complying with the law and those who
are violating it. One who refuses to disclose any information to the Government cannot reasonably complain
at being forced to engage in litigation although he
may be innocent or have a defense.... Since the antitrust laws are basically for the protection of business
and the -public, the course of reasonable cooperation
with a Government investigation would seem to be
proper and wise in most situations.
Loevinger, The Department of Justice and the Antitrust Laws, in J. Von Cise,
Understanding the Antitrust Laws 235, 247 (rev. ed. 1966). Here, the Antitrust
Division is portrayed as the altruistic guardian of both business and the public.
It is therefore impossible to conceive of bureaucratic "fishing expeditions"
which the businessmen's "perfect right" is designed to frustrate.
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making antitrust policy the hostage of "Fortune 500." The Antitrust Division and MNCs both exercise a power which floats free
of its social base, subject to few of the cross-cutting influences
brought to bear on, for example, Congress, the President and many
foreign governments. The Division and MNCs alike propose policies
and the Supreme Court, likewise immune to most forms of outside
pressure, disposes of these recondite matters about which the
American public has few if any opinions. This mnbnage h trois is inherently unstable, incapable of producing a coherent and consistent
flow of antitrust policy, but this does not justify the giving over
of policymaking to big business. 5 1
Even if, as seems likely, Congress now gives MNCs a more
sympathetic hearing, Townsend argues persuasively that businessmen at present lack the evidence needed to justify plausibly the
elimination or radical pruning of extraterritorial antitrust. 5 2 Con51, See Musgrave, The Public Interest, in Nomis V: The Public Interest
107, 108 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962): "The standard of public interest is provided
by the results which would be obtained under perfect competition. Policy
measures to come closer to these results, therefore, are in the public interest."
This is an economist's careful attempt at a general definition, permeated with
American ideals of liberalism and capitalism, which also characterizes the goal
of antitrust policy most frequently mentioned by the Court. To circumvent
this goal, special interests must justify themselves on the basis of superior
performance in the public interest. See Cohn, The Public Interest, in Nomis
V: The Public Interest 115, 119, 121, 124 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962); J.
Townsend, supra note 1, at 227. Arguably, the recent economic performance
of United States MNCs has been far from superior; on occasion, their political
performance has been appalling. MNCs thus face a heavy burden of demonstration that relaxing the enforcement of extraterritorial antitrust will lead to a
future superiority. But see id. at 235: "The public interest has been neither
well enough nor forcefully enough defined to bring about repeal, amendment
or disuse of the Sherman Act and its extraterritorial precedents." Could this
be because the Sherman Act is the public interest, at least in the view of
Congress from 1890 to the present-with due allowance made for legislative
inertia and temporary policy changes during World Wars I and II and the early
New Deal?
52. J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 227-28, 232-35. "Whatever the
pressures or policies of local governments, foreign investment has been
supremely attractive to U.S. business." Id. at 141. Supremely attractive,
I would add, despite "the pressures or policies" of American antitrust. Townsend cites Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's American Challenge (1979), id.
at 131, without pointing out that he voices the fears of influential segments
of European business and political opinion that American business was outstrip
ping the Europeans in their own economic and political markets. This argu-
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gress might abolish the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act anyway, in reaction to the "new protectionism" spreading
through world trade since the oil crisis and worldwide recession
began in 1974-75. Countries are placing primary reliance not on
protective tariffs or quotas but on "rationalization": direct subsidies, preferential tax and credit treatment (e.g., of Chrysler in
the United States), employment schemes which strengthen ailing
industries, and the fostering of international cartels in, for example,
steel and shipbuilding. 5 3 A clever American foreign policy initiative might be used: although the abolition or truncation of extraterritorial antitrust would be a basically mercantilist step, in comparison to the United States policies that now obtain, it could
be "sold" to foreign governments as demonstrating respect for
their sovereignty.
Would such a policy be in the interest of the American public
and/or the world community? A wide variety of new international
cartels could be formed: the cartelization of many industries is
impractical if United States MNCs do not join, but most of these
would participate gleefully if it were lawful to do so. We could
quickly find ourselves back in a 1930s-style international economy,
as production declines worldwide (rationalized in terms of, for
example, eliminating "excess capacity") and protectionist policies
by one government provoke retaliatory measures by others in a
desperate scramble for dwindling markets. Expectations of retaliation would reduce private investment in international activities,
and the resulting decrease in economic growth and increase in
unemployment would fuel domestic demands for additional protectionist measures. 5 4 The extraterritorial application of American
antitrust is one of the few means available to forestall this eventu-

ment would be far less plausible today, but not because of an extraterritorial
antitrust which has remained more or less unchanged over the relevant time
period.
53. See Belassa, The 'New Protectionism' and the International
Economy, 12 J. World Trade L. 409,413-22 (1978).
54. Id. at 421, 428-31. See Adams, The Case for a Comprehensive
and Vigorous Antitrust Policy, in Antitrust Policy and Economic Welfare 1,
13 (W. Sichel ed. 1970); Rosenthal, An Overview of the Guide and its Objectives, in Perspectives on the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust and Other Laws 82 (J. Griffin ed. 1979), wherein the author states: "it
is difficult to be self.righteous about... export cartels ... while being indignant
about OPEC .... 'Beggar my neighbor' always has its limits." Id. at 86.
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ality, 5 this may be one of the reasons why some foreign governments are so strongly opposed to United States antitrust policies.
For example, the United Kingdom, staunchly protectionist even
under the Tories, has promulgated a sweeping statute 5 6 designed
to nullify within its borders the application of American antitrust.
To be sure, the attitudes reflected in this kind of legislation are
justified by assertions that extraterritorial antitrust creates friction
in international relations by offending the dignity of sovereign
states and that it is otherwise contrary to international law. These
issues are mentioned by Townsend, but only in passing. 5 7 Allegations of international law violations are implausible 'so long as rules
concerning a state's legislative capacity in the area of industrial
organization remain hopelessly vague and incomplete. For the
foreseeable future, each country will continue to act in accordance with its own public policy (ordre public).5 8 Disputes concerning industrial organization policies are, however, real and grow55. The United States was established as a "free trade zone" in 1789,
and the Sherman Act was passed when it became too painfully evident that
cartels and combines were able to restrain trade. Davidow, U.S. Antitrust,
Free Trade, and Nonmarket Economies, 12 J. World Trade L. 473 (1978).
It is not ethnocentric to contend that twentieth century trade in the West
has reflected the same kinds of problems faced by American states in 1890:
perhaps there are no antitrust "flags of convenience" corresponding to the
incorporation laws of New Jersey and Delaware, but cartels and MNCs have
proved all but immune to the laws of particular countries and international
rules have been few and tolerant of trade restraints. American rules have exerted
a measure of control, without necessarily embodying the policies that are best
for the international community. See text accompanying note 26 supra. Historical, cultural and political differences among nations are particularly pronounced with regard to the extraterritorial application of national laws. See
H. Zwarensteyn, supra note 25, at 85.
56. The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11 (Halsbury's
Current Statute Service 305 (Issue No. 77)). See also Mannick, Antitrust,
21 Harv. Int'l LJ. 727 (1980).
.57. See J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 128-30.
58. See Shenefield, The Perspective of the U.S. Department of Justice,
in Perspectives on the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust
and Other Laws 12, 13-21 (U. Griffin, ed. 1979); see also Grendell, The Antitrust Legislation of the United States, the European Economic Community,
Germany and Japan, 29 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 64, 65-66 (1980); H. Zwarensteyn,
supra note 25, at 100, 159. The matter is currently under consideration by
UNCTAD: see Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive
Business Practices on its Fourth Session, TD/B/C.2/AD.6/13.
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ing in the realm of international relations. An OECD-sponsored
Consultation and Conciliation Procedure 5 9 has registered limited
successes, but many problems remain. Is it in the interests of the
American public to antagonize foreigners by implementing antitrust policies?
I would argue that there is no simple and clear-cut answer
to this question: balances must be struck separately for each aspect
of antitrust policy, between the net domestic benefits of antitrust
enforcement and the extent to which foreigners are antagonized.
Courts have been striking these kinds of balances, under a "rule
of reason" analysis, 6 0 in certain areas of domestic antitrust for
years, although Timken 61 flatly rejected its application in extraterritorial antitrust cases where the per se rule would apply to
the equivalent domestic violations. While Townsend would apparently prefer to abolish extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction
altogether, he seems to regard the rule of reason approach as a
more easily attainable second-best. 6 2 Starting from different per59. See Recommendation of the Council (OECD) Concerning a Consultation and Conciliation Procedure on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting
International Trade (1973), 19 Antitrust Bull. 283 (1974).
60. See, e.g., Justice Brandeis' formulation in Bd. of Trade of the City
of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), where he stated:
Every agreement concerning trade ... restrains.... The
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business . . . ; the nature of the restraint and
its effect, actual and probable. [K] nowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
Id. at 238. Cf. the "per se" rule, discussed at note 15 and accompanying text
supra.

61. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
see text accompanying note 10 supra.
62. See J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 226-27, 235-36 (citing Kingman
Brewster, Jr.). This is also a dominant thread in businessmen's thinking: "Basically they [antitrust laws] are good statutes, and they have served a good
purpose except where they have been construed in doctrinaire ways by government and the courts. ... The need is for greater flexibility, more responsiveness to dynamic economic changes, more adjustment to the realities of business operation today." H. Brayman, Corporate Management in a World of
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spectives and considering different policy issues, Townsend and
your reviewer arrive at one conclusion together: the desirability
of an extraterritorial rule of reason. If Townsend is serious about
advocating rule of reason analyses, he should have dealt in detail
with significant new cases indicating that the Burger Court favors
this approach. 6 3 Perhaps two of these cases, decided in 1978 and
1979, came too late for inclusion in a book published in July,
1980.
This does not, however, explain Townsend's omission of a
"jurisdictional" rule of reason directly on point, framed by Judge
Choy in Timberlane Lumber: 64

"[I] t is evident that at some point

Politics 216 (1967).
63. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977). Only GTE receives (brief) mention, and in a footnote at that. J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 198 n.74. Townsend prefers to discuss United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 338 U.S. 365 (1967) in the text, J. Townsend,
supra note 1, at 132, relegating to a footnote the fact that GTE "overruled
Schwinn in part." J. Townsend, supra note 1, at 198 n.74. Unfortunately,
the part of Schwinn that was overruled is the part relied upon in the text.
64. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 609
(9th Cir. 1976). This is consistent with the position adopted by the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965),
§§ 18, 40. See Shenefield, The Perspective of the United States Department
of Justice, in Perspectives on the Extraterritorial Application of United States
Antitrust and Other Laws 12, 22-24 (J. Griffin ed. 1979). Even in Pac. Seafarers, Inc. v. Pac. Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied 393 U.S. 1093 (1969), which adopts a sweeping standard of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the court admits that: "[I] t may be fairly inferred,
in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, that Congress did not intend
an application [of the Sherman Act] that would violate principles of international law." 404 F.2d at 814. See text accompanying note 34 supra. There
are dangers associated with giving courts too free a rein in defining and balancing domestic and foreign interests under a rule of reason: see, e.g., Nordenfelt
v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., [18941 A.C. 535. A business and patents were purchased on the basis that the seller would not compete with the new company anywhere in the world for 25 years. An English
court upheld the restraint, despite its being clearly unlawful under Mitchell
v. Reynolds, 24 Erg. Rep. 347 (1711). The presumed basis of the decision
was a reluctance to increase competition in arms sales to tribes who might later
make war against the Crown. L. Schwartz, The Enterprise and Economic
Organization 36 (3d ed. 1966). Similarly, United States courts could become
involved, for good or for ill, for example, in defense policy, which can hardly
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the interests of the United States are too weak and the foreign
harmony incentive for restraint too strong to justify an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction." Choy would balance United States
and foreign interests by examining the effects of the restraint, actual
or intended, and by requiring "a greater showing of burden or
Significantly,
restraint" where foreign interests are involved. 6 5
the Justice Department indicated in 1977 that it would follow an
almost identical approach. 6 6 If it were also adopted by the Supreme
Court, there would be no conceivable need for Congressional action
- unless Congress wishes to bolster the new protectionism. Recent
cases suggest that the Burger Court would be sympathetic to a
jurisdictional rule of reason, 6 7 but its exercise of self-restraint,
and its unwillingness to review the "big" cases in antitrust 6 8 suggest that a clarification will not be forthcoming soon.
In sum, my criticisms of Townsend's book suggest that he
be deemed an appropriate sphere of influence for the judiciary.
65. 549 F.2d at 613. See also Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-93, 1297-98 (3d. Cir. 1979) (United States courts
must balance antitrust enforcement against international comity when deciding
whether to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction). See also Norton, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of United States Antitrust and Security Laws, 28 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 575-97 (1979).
66. See Rosenthal, supra note 48:
[I] t may be appropriate for United States courts to
refrain from asserting [antitrust] jurisdiction ...where
(1) the effect of the conduct in the United States is
not substantial, (2) the United States public interest
in having its law enforced is not substantial, (3) the
United States court is not capable of achieving compliance with United States law, and (4) most of the institutions and conduct in question are located or take place
in the foreign jurisdiction. When all these factors
are present, or one or more of them predominate,
imposing United States jurisdiction is inappropriate
and would not only improperly interfere with foreign
sovereignty but could unduly burden United States
businessmen in competition with some foreign firms.
Id. at 55,655 (footnote omitted).
67. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S.
96 (1978); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); and cases
cited note 63 supra.
68. See Posner, The Antitrust Decisions of the Burger Court, 47 Antitrust LJ. 819,821, 824,826 (1979).
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would have had to analyze extraterritoriality from additional perspectives in a much longer book, in order to justify his policy conclusions adequately. The book he did choose to write is an excellent one, nonetheless. It is, perhaps, a little out of date, but much
less so than the standard works on the subject. 6 9 He gives us an
extensive bibliography and more exhaustive footnoting than the
economics of publishing might lead us to expect today. Townsend's
prose is clear marred only by the occasional mixed metaphor or
malapropism, 7 0 and his chosen combination of legal analysis, advice to businessmen, and surveys of business opinion make for an
interesting read.

69.

See, e.g., K. Brewster, Jr., Antitrust and American Business Abroad

(1958); W. Fugate, Foreign Commerce and Antitrust (2d ed. 1973).
70. One example of such a slip is the following passage:

In early 1978 the Carter Administration put together
a task force. . . . I was heartened to read that my
iceberg was going to be brought out of the closet....
At the same time new laws had broadened the overseas
reach of the Justice Department and put new fire
in the eyes of its precedent makers. The antipodes
were unmistakenly upon us and they forecast more
evil than good. [T] he mountain gave forth the proverbial mouse and my iceberg resumed its original
position.
J. Townsend, supra note 1, at xii. Like most of us, Professor Townsend needs
an editor-or a geologist in this instance. The gloomy forebodings I had when
reading this paragraph in the "Preface" were quickly dispelled by the text
itself. The iceberg, the mountain and the mouse do, however, reappear at

intervals, joined by a glacier. The book was printed from a photo-reduced
typescript and, although the book presumably costs less as a result, this production process seemed to obviate the few editorial touches that were necessary
here.

BOOK REVIEW
International Liquidity Issues. By Thomas D. Willett. Washington:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980.
Pp. 114. $5.25
Reviewed by Raymond ]. Waldmann, Esq. *
Casual browsing through Willett's latest study, International
Liquidity Issues, is not for the timid.1 This publication, one of
American Enterprise Institute's series of studies in economic policy,
reviews recent episodes in the evolution of international finance.
Willett's contribution offers first a lucid defense of the managed
floating exchange rate system, which has existed since the 1971
Smithsonian agreements, and, second, some suggestions for modest
improvements in the existing system and the operation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2 While the audience for these
observations may be a small and largely technical one, it is also likely
to be an influential one in light of Willett's experience and wideranging scholarship in this field. 3
*
Assistant Secretary-Designate for International Economic Policy,
Department of Commerce; formerly Of Counsel, Schiff, Hardin & Waite,
Washington, D.C.
T. Willett, International Liquidity Issues (1980) [hereinafter cited
1.
as Willett].
2.
The IMF was formed in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference.
Its principal architects were Lord Keyes of the British Treasury and Dr. Harry
White of the United States Treasury. See E. Goldenweiser & A. Bourneuf, The
Bretton Woods Agreements, Federal Reserve Bulletin, (September, 1944).
Thomas D. Willett, an AEI adjunct scholar and Horton Professor
3.
of Economics at Claremont Graduate School, has served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for International Research.
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The introduction to the study assesses the developments of the
early 1970's, which focused worldwide attention on the connection
between the expansion of international liquidity, the amount of
money in the world economy, and worldwide inflation. 4 Liquidity
expanded rapidly at the time of the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods fixed exchange rate arrangements. 5 The expansion was compounded with the huge increases in oil prices in 1973 and 1974
and the resulting enormous balance of payments surpluses of the
OPEC countries. Willett concludes that these new realities require
substantial rethinking of the issues surrounding international
liquidity.
The second section of the study analyzes the emergence of
current international liquidity concepts. 6 Willett begins by evaluating the degree to which economic concepts rooted in national
monetary behavior can be generalized to explain international
events. He finds the incentives and constraints operating on governments when controlling domestic monetary supply to be significantly different from those controlling their international monetary behavior, and thus of limited applicability. 7 Instead, one
must focus on the unique institutions and incentives of the international system.
The study then describes these unique factors, starting with
the liberal gold standard system that functioned during the latter
part of the nineteenth century until 1913. Nations were committed
to liberal trade policies, fixed exchange rates and the achievement
of long-run equilibrium in the balance of payments through automatic adjustments. Countries running surpluses as well as those
running deficits would be forced to adjust to restore equilibrium.
In practice, of course, the extent, nature and rapidity of adjustment
varied from country to country, situation to situation, but the
theory was adhered to by all major players in the game. 8
4.
Willett, supra note 1,at 1-5.
5.
For a more introductory treatment of this and other international
economic problems, see P. Samuelson, Economics 645-724 (10th ed. 1976).
6.
Willett, supra note 1, at 6-75.
7.
For contrary views on this conclusion see, e.g., the discussions and
references in M. Whitman, Global Monetarism and the Monetary Approach
to the Balance of Payments, 3 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 491-555
(1975).
8.
For a further analysis of the actual operation of the gold standard
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see A. Bloomfield, Monetary
Policy Under The International Gold Standard: 1880-1914 (1959).
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After the First World War and during the interwar period,
domestic macro-economic conditions more heavily influenced
government policies, and the international monetary system became
less automatic in operation. During the great depression of the
1930's each country tried to stimulate domestic employment
through devaluation and protectionist trade policies, regardless of
their international impact. As a result,9world trade was crippled, and
employment was reduced even further.
After World War II, attempts were made to restore the system
by institutionalizing the pressures to make exchange rate adjustments through the IMF, to restore respectability to the gold standard, and to prevent destructive trade practices through the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 10 Exchange rates were not adjusted with as much frequency as expected, however. Official
prestige became associated with maintaining constant exchange rates,
and rigidities prevented the operation of the system as designed. 1 1
Thus the ground was prepared for the
breakdown of the Bretton
12
Woods agreements in the early 1970's.
Willett then analyzes the causes of the liquidity explosion
since the 1970's, and its impact on world inflation.3 Willett argues
persuasively that the explosion of officially held monetary reserves
altered the perception of monetary authorities, the willingness
to adjust, and even ratcheted up the minimum levels of reserves
which governments sought to hold. 1 4 This part of the study, the
most technical and arcane for the general reader, deals extensively
with an interpretation of events and statistics of that period.
Willett next reviews the liquidity implications of the 1973
9.
Willett, supra note 1, at 13.
10. On the establishment of the postwar international monetary system,
see T. Willett, Floating Exchange Rates and International Monetary Reform
(1977) and the references cited therein.
11. See, e.g., J. Murphy, The International Monetary System (1979).
12. Willett attributes this breakdown to the inability of the system
to adjust to the increase in supply-determined international liquidity caused
by the increased size of the United States payments deficit. This was the result
of the efforts by the United States to finance the Vietnam War without an
increase in taxes thereby overburdening the United States economy. Willett,
supra note 1, at 28.
13. Id. at 29-50.
14. For a further discussion of the policy reactions by the major industrial countries to this monetary expansion see L. Laney & T. Willett, The International Liquidity Explosion and Worldwide Monetary Expansion: 19701972. Claremont Working Papers (Claremont Graduate School, (1980)).
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oil shock and succeeding events through the 1970's.15 The accumulations of reserves by the oil exporting countries were substantial,
but not so large as some of the early forecasts. 16 Nevertheless, he
concludes that the ability of the international financial system
to accommodate the shock was probably greater under floating rates
than it would have been under the Bretton Woods fixed exchange
system. Similarly, for many of the same reasons, Willett feels that
the large dollar holdings abroad currently should not be viewed in
isolation as threats to the soundness of the dollar.
His analysis emphasizes the need to look beyond the behavior
of reserve aggregates in order to determine the effects of liquidity
expansion. Reserve aggregates held by governments and their rates
of growth are not, taken alone, appropriate measures of the effectiveness of the system. Thus the problem of international supervision of the adjustment process must be confronted directly, not
just as a reaction to the size of the reserve aggregates.
The third section of the study develops this theme and offers
some specific proposals for policy making. 1 7 Willett argues that
various bureaucratic, political and economic incentives make the
current international monetary arrangements considerably more
stable than many critics have argued. It must be noted in passing
that Willett was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in
the early 1970's and thus is associated with (and perhaps inclined
to defend) the changes he describes. He refers to various models
for organizing the international monetary system, including the
"free for all regime," the automaticity of the gold standard, supranationality with the IMF as a truly international central bank,
hegemony with one country (such as the United States) in control,
and multilateral negotiation. 1 8 He suggests that the most practical
solution would be a combination of judgmental international guidelines coupled with a great deal of passivity on the part of the United
States. 19 This would argue for a large element of "benign neglect"
15.

Willett, supra note 1, at 50-76.

16. See T. Willett, The Oil Transfer Problem and InternationalEconomic
Stability, Princeton Essays in International Finance, No. 113 (1975).
17. Willett, supra note 1, at 76-101.
18. Id. at 81-82. These models are from B. Cohen, Organizing the
World's Money: The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations

(1977).
19. For an elaboration on this solution see T. Willett, Floating Exchange
Rates and International Monetary Reform (1977).
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toward the United States balance of payments, a position held by
many associated with the freeing of exchange rates in the 1970's.
Willett rounds out this section with a reasoned argument
that current deviations from a desired economic optimality are
not sufficient to trigger major international monetary reform.
Instead, he argues persuasively for marginal improvements in the
existing system. Such improvements would include allowing the
expansion of the special drawing rights (SDR), tying the expansion of SDRs to a greater ability of the IMF to monitor official
dealings in exchange and money markets, and allowing for substitution facilities at the IMF so that countries accumulating less desirexchange them for
able currencies may, under certain conditions,
20
SDRs or more useful reserve currencies.
In a brief final summary chapter, Willett offers some policyoriented conclusions. 2 1 The first three deal with the incentives
facing national decision makers, the inadequacy of reserve aggregates as a guide to liquidity policies, and the importance of continuing flexible exchange rates combined with surveillance of official borrowing from private financial markets. Willett's fourth
conclusion is that the explosion of liquidity had some effect on
worldwide inflation, but much less than that attributed to it.
His last four points focus on the technical functioning of
the international monetary system and the IMF, recognizing the
fact that countries will not easily sacrifice national sovereignty.
Willett argues that the expansion of the Euro-currency markets
and official borrowing from private institutions have not caused
global inflation or loss of financial discipline. Major international
capital flows reflect the fundamental conditions of particular
countries, and are thus not in themselves bad; they are only the
Finally, the IMF needs resources for
"bearers of bad tidings."
discretionary lending in cases in which substantial official exchange
At bottom, however, stable
market intervention is desirable.
national economic and financial policies and continued strengthening of the basic fabric of international economic cooperation are
more important sources of international monetary stability than
20. Created by the IMF in 1967, Special Drawing Rights are accounting
units, distributed among member-countries of the IMF. They are usable to cover
balance-of-payments deficits. D. Snider, Introduction to International Economics 369-70 (5th ed. 1971).
21.
Willett, supra note 1, at 102-03.
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the IMF or other institutional adjustment mechanisms.
This study is a tightly reasoned and worthwhile analysis of
significant problems not usually addressed in the pages of the business or legal press. It will be instructive for those with the time
and inclination to digest it. The questions addressed are primarily
economic, not legal ones. For those interested in the evolution
of the managed floating rate exchange system and some of the issues
now before the international financial community, the book will
be of value.
It should be clear from this brief and necessarily superficial
review that International Liquidity Issues is not a work for everyone. The intended consumers of Willett's study are presumably
Willett's
government policy makers, negotiators and lawyers.
defense of the exchange rate system and his pleas for modest modifications will provide much grist for their mills. A second audience
will be found among economists, academicians, and those other
writers whose works are so extensively noted in Willett's footnotes
and bibliography. For those audiences, the study contains a great
deal, and will aid in their search for a more stable international
monetary system.
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Regulating International Business through Codes of Conduct. By
Raymond J. Waldmann. Washington: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1980. Pp. 139.
Recognizing that there is a continuing American interest in the
development of effective international regulatory regimes, Mr. Waldmann discusses the creation of Codes of Conduct to regulate multinational enterprises and international business transactions. The
book begins with Aldous Huxley's observation that: "Asians and
Africans do not forget [imperialists] and are so far from forgiving
that, if they can thereby do some harm to the ex-imperialists, they
will blithely damage themselves, even commit suicide."
Codes of Conduct, regulating the activities of capital that is
primarily from the industrialized nations, have become a focal point
in the North-South dialogue. Will the Third World nations blithely
damage themselves in the process of creating these new Codes of
international regulation? Mr. Waldmann points to the possibility,
but not the inevitability, of this result.
the
Two existing international agreements are examined:
Andean Investment Code and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) code for multinational enterprises. Of particular importance is the discussion of the impact
of the Andean Code and the responses it has elicited from investors
and potential investors. While apprehension has been expressed
and the fear voiced that future direct investment will be drastically
reduced, no major shift in investment behavior has, in fact, occurred.
Mr. Waldmann then examines three new codes: the UNCTAD
Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, adopted in 1974 but not
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yet in effect; the UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Transfer of Technology, in the stage of negotiation; and the Code of Conduct for
Transnational Corporations, under discussion at the United Nations.
These documents propose sweeping changes and are based on principles alien to the legal systems of the industrialized nations.
The outcome is in doubt. In his concluding remarks, the
author recognizes the "real possibility . . . that the codes could
be discriminatory, nationalistic, and mandatory . . ." leading to
increased tension between North and South and a slowing of the
growth of the international economy. Mr. Waldmann suggests
that the United States must work constructively in the negotiating
process to ensure that American interests are accommodated and
worldwide growth fostered.
Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions in the United States. By
Sarkis J. Khoury. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980.
Pp. 293.
The author discusses in detail numerous issues relating to the
massive inflow of foreign capital and resultant acquisitions of American firms. Approximately one-half of foreign investment ventures
are now accomplished by means of acquisition of existing American
firms. Although the book is primarily an economic and business
analysis there is a well-documented section on the legal issues involved. The subjects treated include: statutory restrictions or
prohibitions to foreign ownership in key industries; antitrust policy;
disclosure requirements under the Williams Act; state tender offer
regulations; and state and federal tax statutes.
Policy and Politics in Britain: The Limits of Consensus. By Douglas
E. Ashford. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981. Pp. 330.
There is little doubt that the advanced form of the welfare
state has greatly changed the relation of politics to policymaking
in every society. Britain is by no means alone in finding government
and administration severely strained as the scope and complexity
of the welfare state increase. In this comprehensive and contextual
study, Mr. Ashford examines how particular historical, institutional
and political constraints affect British effectiveness in planning and
implementing Government programs.
In the British system, parliamentary supremacy rests on the
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widely accepted elite consensus that took shape a century or more
before the British democracy took over the broad responsibilities
associated with the modern welfare state. Modern political parties,
mass democracy, even a modem administration were grafted onto
a working system but the essential principles of cabinet and ministry
responsibilities have survived with relatively little modification.
According to Ashford, a scholar in the field of comparative public
policy, the result has been a concentration of power at the top,
while demands on Government have proliferated.
The analysis offers a strong point of view, unusual in a textbook, that is sure to invite scholarly debate. For example, it argues
that although power is quite concentrated in the British system,
it is exercised most often in the direction of avoiding decisions.
More often than not, the grand adversarial politics played out in
Parliament are ineffective in dealing with the complexities of the
modern welfare state. In practice, when major changes in policy
are at issue, Labor and Conservatives may act less like true antagonists and more like two groups sharing a consensus.
This book is the first in a series that will compare and discuss
the governments of the United States, Japan, West Germany, France,
and Sweden as well as Britain from a policymaking perspective.
Essential to its comparative approach, the books in the series
have selected common policy cases. In turn, each of the policy
analyses follows a common format. First the context of the problem is discussed: its historical roots, competing perceptions of the
problem by major political and social groups, and its interdependence with other problems facing the country. The second section
deals with the agenda set out for the problem: the pressures generating action and the explicit and implicit motives of important political
actors. The third section deals with process: the formulation of
the issue, its attempted resolution and the instruments involved in
policy implementation. The fourth and final section of analysis
traces the consequences of policy for official objectives, for the
power distribution in the issue area, for other policies, and for the
country's capacity to make policy choices in the future.
The Quality of Mercy: Amnesties and Traditional Chinese Justice.
By Brian E. McKnight. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii,
1981. Pp. 172. ($15).
This work focuses on a striking aspect of traditional Chinese
justice, the "great act of grace," an empirewide amnesty that emp-
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tied the prisons and erased the legal record.
While the concept of amnesty is not unknown in other legal
systems, the author points out the unique application of it in the
Chinese system. In medieval China, every two years on average,
the state opened its prison doors, the docket was cleared, the jails
were emptied and the open cases were closed.
The reasons why governments in the early empire let their
prisoners out and why later governments gradually abandoned this
policy are key questions that the author poses in this thorough
examination of the amnesty system.
The answers to these questions, McKnight suggests, are to be
found in the size and shape of the Chinese bureaucracy and in its
efforts to relieve pressures on its criminal justice system.
Although primarily addressed to those interested in the history
of China, this well researched and thoughtful study holds much of
value for students of legal history. Few works have been written
on the role of law in Chinese life. This study makes an important
contribution to what will surely be a growing area of research and
study.

